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INTRODUCTION 
 
One unexamined assumption in foreign ownership regulation is the notion that 
majority voting rights translate to “effective control”.1  This assumption is so deeply 
entrenched in foreign investments law that possession of majority voting rights can 
determine the nationality of a corporation and its capacity to engage in partially 
nationalized economic activities.2 The fact, however, is that minority stockholders can 
possess a degree of voting power higher than what their shareholding size might 
suggest.3 Voting power is not the same as voting weight and is not measured simply by 
the proportion or number of votes a stockholder may cast in a stockholder meeting.4 
An example is a voting situation requiring a simple majority (51%) with 
stockholders 𝑃1 , 𝑃2  and 𝑃3  having 50%, 49% and 1% voting weights, respectively.
5 
While intuition tells us that 𝑃2 has a disproportionate degree of control compared to 𝑃3, it 
is not true that 𝑃2 has more “effective” voting power than 𝑃3.
6 And while intuition also 
tells us that the 1% difference in voting rights between 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 is insubstantial, 𝑃1 still 
wields a more significant degree of control compared to 𝑃2.
7 
First, note that none of the stockholders can single-handedly pass a motion, and 
that we have no prior knowledge of their preferences in forming alliances. Thus, it is fair 
to assume that each stockholder is equally likely to form a coalition with any other 
stockholder, which means a coalition between 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 is just as likely to form as a 
coalition between 𝑃2 and 𝑃3, and 𝑃1 and 𝑃3.
8 All the possible winning coalitions are: {𝑃1, 
𝑃2}, {𝑃1, 𝑃3} and {𝑃1, 𝑃2, 𝑃3}. Second, note that 𝑃1 only needs one more vote to muster 
the required minimum votes to pass a desired stockholder resolution, and it is a matter 
of indifference to 𝑃1 whether that vote comes from 𝑃2 or 𝑃3. Third, 𝑃2 cannot prevail if he 
forms an alliance with 𝑃3 alone. 𝑃1 is a swing voter in all these three instances, while 𝑃2 
is a swing voter in only one instance. By “swing voter”, we mean a voter who can make 
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a coalition lose by dropping out of the coalition.9 𝑃2 cannot block a motion by 𝑃1 once 
the latter forms an alliance with 𝑃3. 𝑃2 also cannot make the grand coalition of all three 
stockholders lose by dropping out. In this context, 𝑃2 is in the same position as 𝑃3.  
There is no doubt, therefore, that 𝑃1 has a voting power disproportionately larger 
than 𝑃2, and we are only talking about a difference of 1% in voting rights between them. 
There is also no doubt that 𝑃2 has a voting power equivalent to that of 𝑃3, even though 
they have a seemingly substantial difference of 48% voting rights. This simple voting 
situation demonstrates that voting weight has a non-linear relationship with actual voting 
power.10 Clearly, “the largest shareholders are not always winners, nor are the smaller 
shareholders predestined losers.”11 
A share of stock represents a bundle of stockholder rights, 12  which include 
economic rights and control rights.13 Economic rights pertain to pecuniary interests, 
such as the right to dividends, right to sell shares, and right to a portion of the net asset 
value upon dissolution and liquidation of the company.14 Control rights, on the other 
hand, allow stockholders to participate in making business decisions. 15  These are 
expressed in terms of voting rights in stockholder meetings, where one share of stock is 
usually equal to one vote.16 Increasing the number of shares (i.e. the shareholding size) 
leads to an increase in economic and control rights. In the case of economic rights, the 
increase is linear and positively correlated. 17  Hence, in a corporation declaring 
dividends, having 10% shareholding size entitles the stockholder to 10% of the total 
dividends declared, 20% shareholding size entitles him to 20%, and so on. 
This notion, however, may erroneously lead us to assume that the relationship 
between shareholding size and control rights is also linear and positively correlated. In 
fact, when we increase shareholding size, control rights do not increase in the same 
manner as economic rights. This assaults our basic intuition about the nature of control 
rights because we know that a higher number of shares results in a higher voting 
weight. 
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Based on the simple voting situation we have shown, we see that examining and 
comparing the voting weights of stockholders does not give a true description of their 
voting power. This is because voting weight is not equivalent to voting power.18 The 1% 
voting weight difference between 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 makes a true difference in determining the 
outcome of the stockholder meeting in a way that the 48% difference between 𝑃2 and 𝑃3 
did not. An increase in 1% shareholding size may result in an equivalent increase of 1% 
voting weight, but it does not necessarily result in an increase of 1% voting power. 
This leads to anomalous situations where foreign minority stockholders have de 
facto control of a Filipino corporation engaged in a partially nationalized economic 
activity, effectively subverting the nationalist policy of the 1987 Constitution and 
Gamboa vs. Teves on foreign equity limitations.19 In the example, assume that 𝑃3 is a 
foreigner and the Filipino corporation is engaged in an industry with 20% foreign equity 
limitation. While 𝑃3’s voting weight of 1% falls comfortably below the equity cap, 𝑃3 has 
a de facto or effective control of 25%, equal to 𝑃2.
20 In the succeeding sections, we shall 
propose and demonstrate a method for calculating “effective control” based on given 
voting thresholds and voting weights. We shall also show instances where the “effective 
control” of a foreign minority stockholder appears to comply with foreign equity caps, but 
has a “real” voting power grossly beyond the allowable threshold. 
This problem exists because the Control Test equates voting power with voting 
weight,21 when the fact is that voting weight can be higher than or less than the actual 
voting power of stockholders.22 By overstating or understating voting power, the Control 
Test permits situations where a Philippine national is actually controlled by foreign 
stockholders, or a foreign national is effectively controlled by Filipino stockholders. By 
relying solely on the “absolute”23 voting weight of one stockholder, the Control Test fails 
to consider a host of factors that determine the true nature of voting power, namely: 
 
(1) Number of stockholders; 
(2) Minimum votes required to pass a stockholder resolution; 
(3) Amount of voting rights held by one stockholder in relation to other stockholders; 
(4) Possibility of forming a coalition of stockholders; 
(5) Number of times that a stockholder can be a swing voter; and 
(6) The size of the public float, if any.24 
 
FOREIGN CONTROL OF STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES AS A GEOPOLITICAL RISK 
 
 Why should de facto foreign control of sensitive economic activities be a concern 
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for the Philippines? Developed nations like Australia, Canada, United Kingdom and 
United States operate under a system of free trade, where foreign ownership limitations 
and other citizenship purity protocols in economic activities are considered sources of 
market distortions and inefficiencies.25 For these countries, it is a matter of indifference 
whether corporations operating vital industries are foreign- or domestic-owned. 
 There is strong political pressure in the Philippines to relax its laws on foreign 
investment limitations. In August 2016, newly elected President Rodrigo Duterte 
expressed willingness for a constitutional amendment to ease foreign ownership 
restrictions imposed by the 1987 Constitution in land ownership, in the exploitation, 
development and utilization of natural resources, and in the operation of public utilities.26 
 The reality, however, is that foreign control of sensitive economic activities is a 
major source of geopolitical risk. Even developed nations operating under a free trade 
are now beginning to recognize this. "Increasingly, corporations are political tools used 
by nations to exert influence over other nations. In times of peace and economic 
prosperity, foreign control of strategic industries and infrastructure may not be an 
immediate threat. But during major economic recessions — or, worse, times of 
geopolitical upheaval and war — the loss of ownership and full control of national 
industries can be catastrophic.”27 
 One example is the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute in 2006. Gazprom, a Russian-
owned gas company, wanted to increase the price of oil passing through Ukraine from 
USD 50 to USD 230 per 1,000 cubic metres. Ukraine rejected the offer. In response, 
Gazprom cut off the supply of gas to Ukraine, causing shortage of gas supply in the 
whole European Union. Many believed that it was not a purely commercial dispute, and 
that it was an instance where a “foreign company’s decisions become an extension of 
the [foreign] government’s policy decisions rather than the company’s commercial 
interests.”28 
 In the same year, there was a national security debate in the U.S. concerning the 
attempted foreign takeover of six major seaports by Dubai Ports World, a government-
owned corporation based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Many national security 
analysts believed that this would render the U.S. susceptible to terrorist attacks, 
considering the large number of containers entering the U.S. and the possibility of 
importing illegal weapons and international transport of terrorists. This led to the 
passage of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, which 
strengthens the power of the U.S. government to review foreign investments in strategic 
industries.29 
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 Another example is the rise of Rosatom, a Russian-owned nuclear corporation, 
which operates in 40 countries and has 29 ongoing global projects, including countries 
like Turkey, Armenia, Finland, Belarus, Vietnam, Bangladesh, India and China. Many 
believe that Rosatom is pivotal in Russia’s nuclear diplomacy.30 
 As of October 2016, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), which are government-
owned foreign investment vehicles, are operating with USD 7.39 trillion assets all over 
the world. This raises several national security concerns for host countries receiving 
their investments, including the “destabilization of the financial markets (to the detriment 
of the host country), protection of SWF home-country industries at the expense of the 
host country’s industries, and the expropriation of technology[.]”31 One of the criticisms 
against SWFs is that most of them are based in authoritarian regimes facing risks of 
political instability, and that these funds could be utilized to further their international 
political agenda. 
 The Philippines is in the midst of a geopolitical game involving China, U.S., and 
Russia, and it is not far-fetched to imagine that foreign investments will play a crucial 
role in the brinkmanship of world superpowers in their struggle to protect their maritime 
interests. With the aim of pursuing an independent foreign policy, President Duterte 
announced opening economic alliances with China and Russia, including the 
development of vital infrastructure projects, like railways and seaports. This makes the 
analysis of de facto control of corporations all the more urgent. 
 
THE STOCKHOLDER MEETING AS A WEIGHTED VOTING GAME 
 
We can remedy the limitations of the Control Test by adopting multiple-factor 
voting power measurements, such as the Banzhaf Voting Power Index in the field of 
cooperative game theory. We shall begin by modeling a traditional stockholder meeting 
as a weighted voting game. 
There are two voting systems in Philippine corporation law: the one person-one 
vote system and the one share-one vote system.32 In the former system, all voters have 
equal voting power.33 This is the default situation in board meetings, where each board 
member present is entitled to only one vote, regardless of whether he is a nominee of a 
stockholder having disproportionate ownership interest in the corporation.34 The same 
default rule applies in non-stock corporations, where each member is entitled to only 
one vote unless otherwise provided in the by-laws.35 
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In the one share-one vote system, a voter can have higher or lesser voting power 
compared to others, depending on the amount of voting shares held.36 This is the rule in 
stockholder meetings of stock corporations, where different percentage holdings yield 
different amount of votes per stockholder.37 This is also the rule where fundamental 
matters require the participation of preferred shareholders.38 
In the one person-one vote system, only two elements are important in 
determining the results of a voting situation: the number of voters and the minimum 
number of votes required to pass a resolution.39 In the one share-one vote system, one 
additional element is essential: the number of votes that each voter is entitled to cast.40 
These three variables qualify the one share-one vote system in stockholder 
meetings as a weighted voting game: the players, the quota, and the weight.41 The 
players represent the stockholders entitled to vote.42 The quota denotes the minimum 
number of votes required to pass a stockholder resolution.43 It is otherwise called the 
decision threshold, which may be majority (51%), super-majority (67%), unanimous 
(100%), or any other threshold specified in the by-laws.44 The weight is the number of 
votes that each player is entitled to cast. It is otherwise called the shareholding size.45 A 
game represents a voting situation involving only two alternative motions: “yes” and 
“no”, where “abstain” is counted as “no”.46 
The one person-one vote system can evolve into a weighted voting game, and a 
weighted voting game can evolve into a one person-one vote system. Consider the 
following scenarios: 
 
1. When one person-one vote system becomes a weighted voting game. – In a 
one person-one vote system, the concept of weight is immaterial if viewed 
from the perspective of individual voters. Voting power is represented as 1 𝑁⁄ , 
where 𝑁 is the total number of players. Thus, if 𝑁 = 10, the voting power of 𝑃1 
is 10%, which is the same for all other players. The concept of weight 
becomes material only if a group of voters is conceived as a coalition, in 
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which case the one person-one vote system also becomes a weighted voting 
game from the perspective of the coalition of voters.47  We consider each 
coalition as a single player, and the weight is the number of voters in a 
coalition.48 Thus, in a board of directors composed of six Filipinos and four 
foreigners, the Filipino coalition has 60% weight and the foreign coalition has 
40% weight.49 Here we have a situation where a board meeting, which is a 
one person-one vote system, being reconfigured as a weighted voting game. 
 
2. When a weighted voting game becomes a one person-one vote system. – If 
all players are required to have one vote to pass a stockholder resolution, 
then the weights become immaterial, just like in a one person-one vote 
system.50 This is the case where no individual player or coalition of players 
can muster enough votes to meet the quota, except the grand coalition of all 
players. In short, the voting situation de facto requires a unanimous vote. 
Hence, given stockholders 𝑃1, 𝑃2 and 𝑃3 with respective weights of 60%, 20% 
and 20%, and a quota of 81% votes, 𝑃1 will always require the votes of 𝑃2 and 
𝑃3  to pass a stockholder resolution. The {60%, 20%, 20%} voting weight 
distribution is irrelevant because even though two stockholders form a 
coalition, they cannot muster 81% of the requisite votes. It is as though the 
voting power of each player is 1/3, or more generally, 1 𝑁⁄ , which is precisely 
the voting power formula in a one person-one vote system. 
 
In modeling the stockholder meeting as a weighted voting game, the absolute 
voting weight of one stockholder is not a sufficient indicator of his voting power.51 In 
order to accurately describe the stockholder’s voting power, it is necessary to consider 
how all the pertinent variables of a weighted voting game (the number of players, the 
quota, the weight, and the coalitions) relate to one another. 52  To facilitate the 
discussion, we shall adopt the formal notation of a weighted voting game to represent a 
stockholder meeting, as follows: 
 
{𝑞: 𝑤1, 𝑤2 … 𝑤𝑁} 
 
 In this notation, q represents the quota; 𝑤1, 𝑤2 … 𝑤𝑁  represents the individual 
stockholders with their respective voting weights; and 𝑁  is the total number of 
stockholders. Hence, in a stockholder meeting requiring a simple majority or 51% to 
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pass a resolution, with five stockholders having a percentage holding distribution of 
50%, 25%, 10%, 10% and 5%, the voting game is expressed as {51: 50, 25, 10, 10, 5}. 
In a stockholder meeting requiring 2/3 or 67% votes to pass a resolution, given the 
same players and weights, the voting game is expressed as {67: 50, 25, 10, 10, 5}.53 
 
THE STOCKHOLDERS AS PLAYERS 
 
For every stockholder meeting, there are three possible types of voting 
stockholders: a “dictator”, a “dummy”, and a player with veto power.54 A dictator has the 
power to pass a resolution single-handedly.55 A dummy is one whose voting power is 
immaterial in passing a resolution.56 And a player with veto power is one whose vote is 
indispensable to pass a resolution, but cannot pass a resolution single-handedly.57 
The dictator status represents the highest degree of control possible in a given 
voting situation. The dummy represents the lowest possible degree of control. And veto 
power represents joint or equal control shared between or among stockholders.58 The 
commonality underlying these three types of stockholders is that their respective 
degrees of control are not solely determined by voting weight.59 This demonstrates the 
notion that voting weight alone is not the sole factor of voting power.60 
We shall examine each of these stockholder types in the succeeding sections. 
We shall also demonstrate the inadequacy of voting weight in determining dictator or 
dummy status and the presence of veto power. 
 
DICTATOR STOCKHOLDERS 
 
 A stockholder with a sufficiently large voting weight to pass a resolution single-
handedly renders the voting weight and voting power of other stockholders immaterial.61 
This “dictator” status satisfies the following condition in a stockholder meeting: 
 
𝑤𝑖 ≥ 𝑞 
  
 The voting weight (𝑤𝑖) of a stockholder must be equal to or higher than the quota 
(𝑞).62 This suggests that voting weight alone is insufficient information to conclude that a 
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stockholder has dictator status. The decision threshold, which may be a simple majority 
(51%), super-majority (2/3 or 67%) or unanimous vote (100%), is a critical element. 
Consider the following voting situations in a stockholder meeting: 
 
1. {51: 51, 49} 
2. {67: 51, 49} 
3. {100: 99, 1} 
 
In the first example, the quota is 51%, with stockholders 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 having 51% 
and 49% voting rights, respectively. Since 𝑃1 can single-handedly pass a resolution, he 
has a dictator status in a voting game. The situation is effectively the same as a voting 
situation with {100: 100, 0} voting power distribution. 𝑃1 has an effective voting power of 
100% because he does not need the cooperation of 𝑃2 to muster enough votes in a 
stockholder meeting. And while the 49% voting rights of 𝑃2  may appear to be a 
considerable amount of voting power, 𝑃2  has an effective voting power of only 0% 
because his vote will never be relevant in determining the outcome of the stockholder 
meeting. In short, it does not matter whether 𝑃2 has 0% or 49% voting rights, or any 
arbitrary shareholding size between 0% and 49%, as long as the voting weight of 𝑃1 is 
equal to or greater than the quota of 51%. 
In the second example, the quota is a super-majority requirement of 2/3 votes or 
67%, with stockholders 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 having the same voting rights as in the first example. 
The only difference between the first and second examples is the quota. However, this 
difference makes 𝑃1 lose his dictator status. In fact, 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 have joint control in the 
corporation, with an effective voting power distribution of {100: 50, 50}. It is a matter of 
indifference whether 𝑃1’s voting weight of 51% is higher than 𝑃2’s voting weight of 49%. 
The voting rights differential of 2% is irrelevant in determining the outcome of the 
stockholder meeting. 
In the third example, the quota requires a unanimous vote, with stockholder 𝑃1 
having 99% voting rights and 𝑃2 having 1% voting rights. Their percentage holdings 
differ by a wide margin. However, considering a quota of 100%, their effective voting 
power distribution is {100: 50, 50}, which is the same as the effective voting power 
distribution in the second example. In the second example, the difference in voting 
rights is 2%. In the third example, the difference is 98%. These differences, however, 
are immaterial in determining the final outcome of the stockholder meeting. 𝑃2 ’s 1% 
voting weight is indispensable to pass a stockholder resolution. 
The differences in voting weight distribution and effective voting power 
distribution in the three scenarios are summarized as follows: 
 
Voting Weight Distribution Voting Power Distribution 
{51: 51, 49} {100: 100, 0} 
{67: 51, 49} {100: 50, 50} 
{100: 99, 1} {100: 50, 50} 
 
The left column describes the de jure allocation of control in the corporation, 
which uses “voting weight” as a criterion, while the right column describes the de facto 
allocation of control, which uses the concept “voting power”.63 
In these examples, only the first has a dictator. This shows that a dictator status, 
which represents the highest degree of control possible in a stockholder meeting, is a 
relationship between two factors: the quota and the voting weight of a stockholder in 
relation to the voting weight of the other stockholder/s. This shows further that merely 
relying on the absolute voting weight of one stockholder gives incomplete information 
about his true voting power.64 
 
DUMMY STOCKHOLDERS  
 
 A stockholder whose voting weight is immaterial in determining the outcome of a 
stockholder meeting is a “dummy”, which represents the lowest degree of control 
possible in a corporation.65 A stockholder is a dummy if the following conditions are 
satisfied: 
 
1. There is no single instance that he can make any possible coalition of stockholders 
prevail in a stockholder meeting by joining; and 
2. There is no single instance that he can make any coalition lose by dropping out.  
 
Whenever there is a dictator, all other stockholders are dummies.66 This is true in 
the first example in the previous section, involving the voting rights distribution {51: 51, 
49}, with 𝑃1  as dictator. 𝑃2  can neither help 𝑃1  prevail nor block his motion in a 
stockholder meeting because 𝑃1’s voting weight is already equal to the quota. 
It is also possible to have dummy stockholders where there is no dictator. 
Moreover, a stockholder can be a dummy even though he has a nearly equal voting 
weight as the other stockholders. Consider the following illustrations: 
 
1. {51: 49.5, 49.5, 1.0} 
2. {51: 50, 49, 1} 
3. {67: 34, 34, 32} 
 
The first example has a quota of 51% and stockholders 𝑃1, 𝑃2 and 𝑃3 have voting 
weights of 49.5%, 49.5% and 1.0%, respectively. 𝑃3 is a dummy because there is no 
single instance that he can make a coalition with 𝑃1 or 𝑃2 prevail in a voting situation. 
Furthermore, there is no single instance that he can make the grand coalition of all 
stockholders lose in a voting situation by dropping out. In short, 𝑃3’s voting weight is 
immaterial in determining the outcome of a stockholder meeting. 
Compare this with the second example, which has the same quota as the first 
example, but with a very miniscule modification in the voting rights of 𝑃1 and 𝑃2, with 
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respective voting weights of 50% and 49%. Here, we merely shifted .5% from 𝑃2 to 𝑃1’s 
voting weight, while 𝑃3’s voting weight of 1% remains unchanged from the first example. 
Notice that this minor change of .5% in the voting rights of other stockholders 
made 𝑃3 lose his dummy status. Suddenly, 𝑃3 becomes a critical voter and can make 𝑃1 
win or lose without the cooperation of 𝑃2 . 𝑃3 ’s voting weight of 1% may be 
disproportionately lower than 𝑃2 ’s voting weight of 49%, but 𝑃3 ’s voting power is 
effectively or de facto equal to 𝑃2. 
The third example shows that a nearly equal voting weight can still result in 
disproportionate degrees of voting power. With a quota of 2/3 or 67% super-majority 
votes, and a voting rights distribution of 34-34-32, 𝑃3 has a nearly equal voting weight 
as 𝑃1 and 𝑃2. 𝑃3’s voting weight differs only by a margin of 2%, yet it is inaccurate to say 
that 𝑃3  has equal voting power as 𝑃1  and 𝑃2 . The truth is that only 𝑃1  and 𝑃2  have 
effective control of the corporation, with de facto control of 50-50 voting power. 
Meanwhile, 𝑃3 has 0% voting power. This is because 𝑃1 or 𝑃2 cannot muster enough 
votes to pass a resolution by forming a coalition with 𝑃3. Second, a coalition composed 
of 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 is the only possible winning coalition. Third, in a grand coalition composed 
of all stockholders, 𝑃3 is not a critical voter—i.e., dropping out will not make the coalition 
lose. This renders 𝑃3 a dummy. 
The differences in voting weight distribution and effective voting power 
distribution in the two scenarios are summarized as follows: 
 
Voting Weight Distribution Voting Power Distribution 
{51: 49.5, 49.5, 1.0} {100: 50, 50, 0} 
{51: 50, 49, 1} {100: 50, 25, 25} 
{67: 34, 34, 32} {100: 50, 50, 0} 
 
Again, the left column describes the de jure allocation of control in the 
corporation, while the right column describes the de facto allocation of control. Only the 
first and third examples have dummies, represented by 0% voting power.67 
This demonstrates the weakness of the Control Test in describing the true voting 
power of stockholders. First, the voting weights of other stockholders can modify the 
voting power of a stockholder, even though the latter’s voting weight remains 
unchanged.68 Second, we cannot judge the voting power of a stockholder merely by 
looking at the magnitude of his voting weight. A less than 1% shift in voting weight, or a 
voting rights differential of 2%, can modify the total voting power distribution in the 
whole corporation.69 Third, a stockholder can have as many votes as other stockholders 
and yet still be a dummy.70 
 
VETO POWER 
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Veto power is that degree of voting power that can block a motion, but cannot on 
its own pass a motion.71 It is a lower degree of control compared to a dictator status. A 
stockholder with veto power satisfies the following two conditions: 
 
𝑤1 < 𝑞 
 
(∑ 𝑤𝑖) − 𝑤1 < 𝑞 
 
 The first condition is that the stockholder’s voting weight (𝑤1) should be less than 
the quota (q); otherwise, he is a dictator. The second condition is that the total voting 
weights of all stockholders (∑ 𝑤𝑖), minus the stockholder’s voting weight (𝑤1), should be 
less than the quota (q). This means that even if all other stockholders form a coalition, 
they cannot muster the required minimum votes to pass a stockholder resolution.72 The 
stockholder’s vote is indispensable, but he himself cannot pass a resolution single-
handedly. He has power to prevent a motion from passing, but he has no unilateral 
power to pass a motion. He can make the coalition of all other stockholders win or lose 
in a stockholder meeting.73 
 In a corporation with only two stockholders, a stockholder with veto power has a 
de facto control of 50% voting power, regardless of what his shareholding size or voting 
weight might be.74 These two conditions that create veto power describe a relationship 
between voting weight distributions and the quota. As in the previous sections, we 
cannot deduce whether a stockholder has veto power based on his absolute voting 
weight alone.75 Consider the following illustrations: 
 
1. {51: 50, 25, 25} 
2. {67: 40, 30, 30} 
3. {100: 33, 33, 33, 1} 
 
 In the first example, 𝑃1 cannot pass a motion single-handedly because his voting 
weight of 50% is less than the quota of 51%. The combined voting weight of 𝑃2 and 𝑃3, 
which is 50%, is also less than the quota. 𝑃1’s vote is indispensable if 𝑃2 and 𝑃3 want to 
pass a motion. He can likewise make the coalition of 𝑃2 and 𝑃3 lose in the stockholder 
meeting. The second example has essentially the same voting power setup as in the 
first example, with 𝑃1  having a veto power because 𝑃2  and 𝑃3  absolutely require his 
cooperation to pass a motion. 
 The third example exemplifies the non-monotonicity between voting weight and 
voting power. Since the quota requires a unanimous vote, 𝑃4’s measly voting weight of 
1% is, in reality, equivalent to 25% voting power. This is also an instance where a 
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weighted voting game like a stockholder’s meeting evolves into a one person-one vote 
system, where each voter has de facto equal voting power, calculated simply as 1 𝑁⁄ , 
where 𝑁 signifies the number of voting stockholders. 
The differences in voting weight distribution and effective voting power 
distribution in the three scenarios are summarized as follows: 
 
Voting Weight Distribution Voting Power Distribution 
{51: 50, 25, 25} {100: 50, 25, 25} 
{67: 40, 30, 30} {100: 50, 25, 25} 
{100: 33, 33, 33, 1} {100: 25, 25, 25, 25} 
 
 Based on the previous two sections and this section, a dictator stockholder has 
100% voting power, a dummy stockholder has 0% voting power, while a stockholder 
with veto power has 50% voting power or x% voting power equal to all other 
stockholders. These figures reflect de facto or effective control regardless of the 
magnitude of their voting weights. 
 
STOCKHOLDER COALITIONS 
 
The Control Test fails to consider the possibility of stockholder coalitions, or 
situations where a stockholder will join other stockholders to pass a motion through their 
combined voting weight.76 The reality is that a given voting weight can have varying 
degrees of voting power depending on whether it is sufficiently relevant to make 
alliances win or lose in a stockholder meeting.77 A stockholder’s voting weight of x% is 
of value to another stockholder if their combined voting weights can pass a resolution, 
and is of less value if it cannot.78 To facilitate discussion, we shall adopt the following 
notations to denote a stockholder coalition: 
 
{𝑃1, 𝑃2, 𝑃3} 
 
A coalition composed of all stockholders is called the “grand coalition”. A coalition 
that can muster sufficient votes to meet the quota is called the “winning coalition”. A 
coalition that has insufficient votes to meet the quota is a “losing coalition”. The 
combined voting weight of stockholders in a coalition is called the “coalition weight”. The 
coalition weight of a winning coalition is always equal to or higher than the quota, and 
the coalition weight of a losing coalition is always lower than the quota.79 
How do stockholder coalitions affect the individual voting power of a stockholder? 
A stockholder who can make a coalition win or lose has higher voting power compared 
to a stockholder whose voting weight is irrelevant to a coalition. In short, a stockholder 
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who is a “swing voter” has more degree of control. To be a swing voter, the voting 
weight of a stockholder can either turn a losing coalition into a winning coalition or a 
winning coalition into a losing coalition. A stockholder who cannot make a losing 
coalition win by joining, or a winning coalition lose by dropping out, is not a swing voter 
and has low degree of control. We shall discuss this more thoroughly in the section on 
Critical Stockholders.80 
How do we know which stockholder coalitions will form? The answer is that we 
can never know just by looking at an arbitrary list of stockholders and their voting 
weights. Since we have no knowledge of the preferences of stockholders in forming 
alliances, it is necessary to list all possible coalitions for every given set of 
stockholders.81 The total possible stockholder coalitions can be obtained through the 
following82: 
 
2𝑁 − 1 
 
 N denotes the total number of stockholders. The formula counts a lone 
stockholder as a single coalition. Hence, in a corporation with two stockholders, there 
are 3 possible coalitions: {𝑃1} , {𝑃2} , and {𝑃1, 𝑃2} . In a corporation with three 
stockholders, there are 7 possible coalitions: {𝑃1}, {𝑃2}, {𝑃3}, {𝑃1, 𝑃2}, {𝑃2, 𝑃3}, {𝑃1, 𝑃3}, 
and {𝑃1, 𝑃2, 𝑃3}. Consider the following voting situations: 
 
1. {51: 50, 49, 1} 
2. {67: 40, 30, 30} 
 
In the first example, the total possible coalitions and the voting outcome for each 
coalition are illustrated as follows: 
 
Possible 
Coalitions 
Coalition 
Weight 
Voting Outcome 
{𝑃1} 50 Losing Coalition 
{𝑃2} 49 Losing Coalition 
{𝑃3} 1 Losing Coalition 
{𝑃1, 𝑃2} 99 Winning Coalition 
{𝑃2, 𝑃3} 50 Losing Coalition 
{𝑃1, 𝑃3} 51 Winning Coalition 
{𝑃1, 𝑃2, 𝑃3} 100 Winning Coalition 
 
In the second example, the total possible coalitions and the voting outcome for 
each coalition are illustrated as follows: 
 
Possible 
Coalitions 
Coalition 
Weight 
Voting Outcome 
{𝑃1} 40 Losing Coalition 
{𝑃2} 30 Losing Coalition 
{𝑃3} 30 Losing Coalition 
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{𝑃1, 𝑃2} 70 Winning Coalition 
{𝑃2, 𝑃3} 60 Losing Coalition 
{𝑃1, 𝑃3} 70 Winning Coalition 
{𝑃1, 𝑃2, 𝑃3} 100 Winning Coalition 
 
CRITICAL STOCKHOLDERS 
 
 A critical stockholder is a swing voter in a stockholder coalition.83 He can make a 
winning coalition lose by dropping out, or he can make a losing coalition win by 
joining.84 Therefore, a critical stockholder satisfies the following condition: 
 
𝑤𝑐 − 𝑤𝑖 < 𝑞 
 
In this condition, 𝑤𝑐  represents the coalition weight; 𝑤𝑖  represents the voting 
weight of a stockholder who is a member of the coalition; and 𝑞 represents the quota.85 
We measure voting power by the number of times that the stockholders are critical 
stockholders, given all possible stockholder coalitions. Consider the following voting 
situations: 
 
1. {51: 50, 49, 1} 
2. {67: 50, 49, 1} 
3. {51: 40, 30, 30} 
4. {67: 40, 30, 30} 
 
For the first example, 𝑃1 has the highest voting power while 𝑃2 and 𝑃3 have equal 
voting powers. Our basis for this conclusion is that, given all 7 possible stockholder 
coalitions, 𝑃1  is a critical stockholder in three instances, while 𝑃2  and 𝑃3  are critical 
stockholders once. This is illustrated as follows: 
 
Possible 
Coalitions 
Coalition 
Weight 
Voting Outcome 
Critical 
Stockholders 
𝑃1 𝑃2 𝑃3 
{𝑃1} 50 Losing Coalition    
{𝑃2} 49 Losing Coalition    
{𝑃3} 1 Losing Coalition    
{𝑃1, 𝑃2} 99 Winning Coalition      
{𝑃2, 𝑃3} 50 Losing Coalition    
{𝑃1, 𝑃3} 51 Winning Coalition      
{𝑃1, 𝑃2, 𝑃3} 100 Winning Coalition     
Number of Times that Stockholder is Critical 3 1 1 
 
In the second example, we have the same voting rights distribution as in the first 
example, but we changed the quota from a simple majority of 51% to a super-majority of 
67%. This also modifies the voting power of the stockholders, with 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 having 
equal control and 𝑃3 having 0% effective control. Again, the basis for this conclusion is 
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the number of times that the stockholders are critical voters in all possible coalitions. 
This is illustrated as follows: 
 
Possible 
Coalitions 
Coalition 
Weight 
Voting Outcome 
Critical 
Stockholders 
𝑃1 𝑃2 𝑃3 
{𝑃1} 50 Losing Coalition    
{𝑃2} 49 Losing Coalition    
{𝑃3} 1 Losing Coalition    
{𝑃1, 𝑃2} 99 Winning Coalition      
{𝑃2, 𝑃3} 50 Losing Coalition    
{𝑃1, 𝑃3} 51 Losing Coalition    
{𝑃1, 𝑃2, 𝑃3} 100 Winning Coalition      
Number of Times that Stockholder is Critical 2 2 0 
 
The third example shows all stockholders having the same or equal degrees of 
control, which means that given a quota of 51%, the additional 10% voting weight of 𝑃1 
compared to the voting weights of 𝑃2 and 𝑃3 is immaterial in determining the outcome of 
a stockholder meeting. This is illustrated as follows: 
 
Possible 
Coalitions 
Coalition 
Weight 
Voting Outcome 
Critical 
Stockholders 
𝑃1 𝑃2 𝑃3 
{𝑃1} 40 Losing Coalition    
{𝑃2} 30 Losing Coalition    
{𝑃3} 30 Losing Coalition    
{𝑃1, 𝑃2} 70 Winning Coalition      
{𝑃2, 𝑃3} 60 Winning Coalition      
{𝑃1, 𝑃3} 70 Winning Coalition      
{𝑃1, 𝑃2, 𝑃3} 100 Winning Coalition    
Number of Times that Stockholder is Critical 2 2 2 
 
The fourth example retains the same voting rights distribution as in the third 
example, but we changed the quota from a simple majority of 51% to a super-majority of 
67%. With this change, the additional 10% voting weight of 𝑃1  suddenly gains 
relevance, making him the stockholder with highest voting power. This is illustrated as 
follows: 
 
Possible 
Coalitions 
Coalition 
Weight 
Voting Outcome 
Critical 
Stockholders 
𝑃1 𝑃2 𝑃3 
{𝑃1} 40 Losing Coalition    
{𝑃2} 30 Losing Coalition    
{𝑃3} 30 Losing Coalition    
{𝑃1, 𝑃2} 70 Winning Coalition      
{𝑃2, 𝑃3} 60 Losing Coalition    
{𝑃1, 𝑃3} 70 Winning Coalition      
{𝑃1, 𝑃2, 𝑃3} 100 Winning Coalition     
Number of Times that Stockholder is Critical 3 1 1 
 
FORMAL DEFINITION OF VOTING POWER 
 
 We are now ready to provide a formal definition of voting power in a stockholder 
meeting. While the Control Test simply defines voting power as voting weight, we 
propose voting power as: 
 
𝑉𝑖 =
𝛽𝑖
∑ 𝛽𝑖
  
 
 𝑉𝑖 denotes the voting power of a given stockholder 𝑃𝑖. 𝛽𝑖  denotes the number of 
times that stockholder 𝑃𝑖  is a critical stockholder in all possible stockholder 
coalitions. ∑ 𝛽𝑖 denotes the total number of times that all stockholders are critical 
stockholders in all possible stockholder coalitions. 86  Applying this definition, we 
summarize the voting powers of stockholders in the four examples in the previous 
section, as follows: 
 
Voting Situations 
𝛽𝑖 ∑ 𝛽𝑖 𝑃1 𝑃2 𝑃3 
{51: 50, 49, 1} 3 1 1 5 
{67: 50, 49, 1} 2 2 0 4 
{51: 40, 30, 30} 2 2 2 6 
{67: 40, 30, 30} 3 1 1 5 
 
 The resulting voting power distribution is as follows: 
 
Voting Situations 
𝑉𝑖 
𝑃1 𝑃2 𝑃3 
{51: 50, 49, 1} 60% 20% 20% 
{67: 50, 49, 1} 50% 50% 0% 
{51: 40, 30, 30} 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 
{67: 40, 30, 30} 60% 20% 20% 
 
 Applying the formula for voting power, we reveal degrees of control that are not 
obvious when we merely look at the voting weight distributions of stockholders. 
 
DE FACTO FOREIGN CONTROL IN STOCKHOLDER MEETINGS 
 
 The thesis postulated in the introduction is that the Control Test does not 
guarantee that a foreign minority stockholder will have minority control. A stockholder 
does not have “minority” control if, empirically, he has equal or higher degree of control 
compared to other stockholders. Hence, there are two parameters that can falsify the 
Control Test: first, if the voting power of a foreign stockholder is equal to the voting 
power of each of the Filipino stockholders, and second, if his voting power is greater 
than that of each of the Filipino stockholders. Under the first parameter, we say that the 
foreign stockholder has “joint control”, and under the second parameter, that he has de 
facto or “effective control”. 
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The question, therefore, is: when do foreign minority voting rights result in joint 
control, or de facto or effective control by foreigners? In other words, what are the 
instances when a corporation complies with a given foreign equity limitation, but a 
foreign minority stockholder has equal or more voting power compared to Filipino 
stockholders? Consider the following voting situations: 
 
Voting Weight 
Distribution 
(𝑃1 : foreigner) 
Voting Power Distribution 
(𝑉𝑖) 
Simple Majority 
(q = 51%) 
Super-Majority 
(q = 67%) 
{60, 40} {100%, 0%} {50%, 50%} 
{40, 60} {0%, 100%} {50%, 50%} 
{40, 30, 30} {33.33%, 33.33%, 33.33%} {60%, 20%, 20%} 
{40, 20, 20, 20} {50%, 16.67%, 16.67%, 16.67%} {40%, 20%, 20%, 20%} 
{49, 51} {0%, 100%} {50%, 50%} 
{49, 26, 25} {33.33%, 33.33%, 33.33%} {60%, 20%, 20%} 
{49, 17, 17, 17} {50%, 16.67%, 16.67%, 16.67%} {40%, 20%, 20%, 20%} 
{30, 70} {0%, 100%} {0%, 100%} 
{30, 24, 23, 23} {50%, 16.67%, 16.67%, 16.67%} {25%, 25%, 25%, 25%} 
{25, 75} {0%, 100%} {0%, 100%} 
{25, 38, 37} {33.33%, 33.33%, 33.33%} {0%, 50%, 50%} 
{25, 19, 19, 19, 18} {20%, 20%, 20%, 20%, 20%} {20%, 20%, 20%, 20%, 20%} 
{20, 80} {0%, 100%} {0%, 100%} 
{20, 40, 40} {33.33%, 33.33%, 33.33%} {0%, 50%, 50%} 
{20, 27, 27, 26} {0%, 33.33%, 33.33%, 33.33%} {25%, 25%, 25%, 25%} 
{20, 16, 16, 16, 16, 
16} 
{33.33%, 13.33%, 13.33%, 13.33%, 13.33%, 
13.33%} 
{30%, 14%, 14%, 14%, 14%, 
14%} 
 
 The table lists various voting weight distributions in corporations engaged in 
partially nationalized economic activities, with 𝑃1 as the lone foreign stockholder. For 
every voting weight distribution, the voting weight of 𝑃1 maximizes a given foreign equity 
limitation. Hence, in the {60, 40} distribution, foreign stockholder 𝑃1 has a voting weight 
of 60%, which maximizes the allowable foreign equity in financing companies and 
investment houses regulated by SEC, as provided in Section 6 of R.A. 5980 as 
amended by R.A. 8556 and P.D. 129 as amended by R.A. 8366. In the {40, 60} 
distribution, foreign stockholder 𝑃1  has a voting weight of 40%, which is also the 
maximum foreign equity in public utility companies, as provided in Section 11 of Article 
XII of the 1987 Constitution. 
The voting weight distributions may pertain to voting shares, or to the total 
outstanding capital stock, which includes both voting and non-voting shares. As 
provided in Gamboa vs. Teves, the foreign equity cap applies to the total outstanding 
capital stock and to each class of shares, whether voting or non-voting.87 Hence, the 
resulting voting power distribution of the given voting weight distribution is true whether 
the voting situation includes all or only some classes of shares. For instance, the voting 
weight distribution {51: 40, 30, 30}, which results in a {33.33%, 33.33%, 33.33%} voting 
power distribution, is true whether the context is a stockholder meeting requiring 
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approval of submitted matters, which only involve common stockholders, or 
fundamental matters, which involve all stockholders, whether common or preferred 
shareholders. 
In all instances, 𝑃1  is the lone foreigner in the corporation and all other 
stockholders are Filipinos. The different scenarios explore voting situations where there 
is only one, few or many Filipino stockholders, given the same voting weight for 𝑃1. For 
instance, where 𝑃1 maximizes a foreign equity cap of 40%, we explore scenarios where 
there is only one or two other Filipino stockholders. We also explore different 
combinations of voting weights between or among the Filipino stockholders. As shown 
in previous disquisitions, reconfiguring the voting weights of other stockholders can 
reconfigure the voting power of a stockholder whose voting weight remains unchanged. 
The first column under voting weight distribution represents the de jure allocation 
of control in the corporation, which renders 𝑃1 as a minority stockholder in terms of 
voting weight. The distribution merely reflects the shareholding size of each stockholder. 
Since the foreigner only occupies a de jure minority position88, the corporation passes 
the Control Test, and is therefore considered a Philippine national for the purpose of 
complying with foreign equity limitations. 
The second and third columns under voting power distribution represents the de 
facto allocation of control, which shows degrees of power that are not obvious if we only 
look at the voting weight distribution in the first column, as prescribed by the Control 
Test. For the voting power distribution, we apply the formal definition of voting power as 
𝑉𝑖. This results in a de facto control allocation that is different from the de jure control 
allocation coming from the voting weight distribution. 
We have explained in the previous sections how the quota can reconfigure the 
voting power of stockholders, even if the voting weight distribution remains unchanged. 
Hence, the voting power distribution is divided into two columns by quota: whether 
simple majority (51%) or super-majority (2/3 or 67%). We have excluded a column for a 
quota requiring unanimous votes (100%) since, naturally, this will render all the 
stockholders in all voting situations to have equal degrees of control, similar to a one 
person-one vote system. 
Why should we give emphasis to simple majority and super-majority voting 
requirements? This is because the Corporation Code reserves certain matters to be 
decided by the stockholders and prescribes the corresponding quota. Apart from the 
selection of the members of the Board of Directors, matters requiring stockholder 
approvals include: (1) those required by law to be approved by the stockholders with 
voting shares; (2) those required by law to be approved by the stockholders regardless 
of whether they hold voting or non-voting shares; and (3) those submitted by 
management to the stockholders for approval, which by default only involve 
stockholders with voting shares, unless otherwise provided in the by-laws.89 
The voting weight distribution and the quota allow us to derive 𝑉𝑖 . The voting 
power distribution indicates that it is possible for a Philippine national to be under the 
“effective control” of a foreign minority stockholder. It is also possible to pass the Control 
Test, even though the foreign minority stockholder has “joint control” of the corporation. 
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 In the {60, 40} voting weight distribution and given a simple majority voting 
requirement, 𝑃1 has “effective control” and is a dictator stockholder because his voting 
weight is higher than the quota. Therefore, his voting power is 100% and that of the 
Filipino stockholder, 0%, even though the latter has a 40% voting weight. It does not 
matter whether 𝑃2 has 1% voting weight or 40%. By imposing a super-majority voting 
requirement, however, 𝑃1 loses his dictator status because he can no longer unilaterally 
pass a stockholder resolution. Nevertheless, he has “joint control”, and the Filipino 
stockholder (𝑃2) cannot pass a stockholder resolution without the cooperation of the 
foreign stockholder. 
 In the {40, 60} voting weight distribution, 𝑃1  has virtually no control of the 
corporation, but in a matter requiring super-majority votes, 𝑃1 has joint control. If we 
compare this to the {40, 30, 30} voting weight distribution, we see the instant effect of 
having more Filipino stockholders and of dispersing the 60% voting weight between 
them. With simple majority voting requirement, 𝑃1  has joint control, but with super-
majority voting requirement, 𝑃1 has de facto or effective control. The effect of dispersing 
the Filipino bloc of shares to more Filipino stockholders is more obvious if we compare 
this further to the {40, 20, 20, 20} voting weight distribution, where 𝑃1  has de facto 
control regardless of whether the vote calls for simple majority or super-majority. 
 We see the same pattern in the succeeding voting weight distributions, with 
foreign equity limitations of 49%, 30%, 25% and 20%. The voting power of foreign 
stockholder 𝑃1  increases based on two factors: first, when the quota is raised, and 
second, when the total voting weight of Filipino stockholders is dispersed among an 
increasing number of Filipino stockholders. As we increase the quota, the number of 
Filipino stockholders, and the level of voting weight dispersion among them, we see an 
increasing progression in the voting power of the foreign stockholder. The voting power 
of 𝑃1 changes from having no control to joint control, and finally from joint control to de 
facto or effective control. These changes occur even if the foreign stockholder’s 
shareholding size remains unchanged and even if the corporation continues to be 
considered a Philippine national under the Control Test. 
One question that arises is: why compare the voting power of a foreign 
stockholder with that of each of the Filipino stockholders, if the Control Test treats all 
Filipino stockholders as one coalition? This is because the Control Test does not 
account for the fact that a stockholder who deals with fewer stockholders to pass a 
resolution has higher voting power than a stockholder who needs to deal with more 
stockholders. The voting power distribution accounts for this fact. For example, in the 
{40, 20, 20, 20} voting weight distribution, the Control Test presumes as a matter of 
legal fiction that 𝑃2, 𝑃3 and 𝑃4 will form a coalition of Filipino stockholders. This is the 
reason why the Control Test adds the voting weights of the individual Filipino 
stockholders to determine the Filipino coalition weight. However, in the voting power 
distribution, 𝑉𝑖  does not assume that stockholders of the same nationality will form a 
coalition. It measures all possible stockholder coalitions, and determines which 
stockholder has the most advantageous position based on the voting weight distribution 
and the quota. 
We have discussed the possibility that a foreign minority stockholder has de facto 
control of stockholder approvals. The next section is equally important: the possibility of 
de facto foreign control of the Board of Directors, notwithstanding the fact that foreign 
stockholders can only elect their nominees to the Board to the extent of their foreign 
equity participation. 
 
DE FACTO FOREIGN CONTROL OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
 
 There are four types of voting situations in the corporation: (1) those involving 
common stockholders, (2) those involving all stockholders, (3) election by common 
stockholders of members of the Board of Directors, and (4) voting situations within the 
level of the Board of Directors.90 The preceding section modeled the first two voting 
situations as a weighted voting game, involving players with voting weights and a quota. 
The third voting situation cannot be modeled as a weighted voting game because 
the election of Directors does not involve two alternative motions (i.e. “yes” and “no”). 
Rather, it is a situation where the voting weight of a common stockholder is translated 
into his number of representatives in the Board of Directors. The common stockholder’s 
number of representatives becomes a proxy for his voting weight in the Board of 
Directors. Therefore, the election of Board of Directors merely transposes the voting 
weight distribution of common stockholders into the voting weight distribution of 
nominees in the Board. But this is only true if we view the nominees of one stockholder 
as a single coalition. 
The fourth voting situation, which only involves the level of the Board, is a one 
person-one vote system. The Directors do not vote as a coalition of nominees of their 
respective nominator stockholder. Each Director exercises his own discretion and is 
entitled to one vote. This characterizes the voting situation within the Board as a one 
person-one vote system, where each voter has equal degree of control as the others. 
Notwithstanding the fact that each Director is entitled to only one vote and that 
each Director has equal degree of control as the others, we have postulated in a 
previous section (The Stockholder Meeting as a Weighted Voting Game) that we can 
reconfigure a one person-one vote system into a weighted voting game. To recall, we 
stated that the concept of voting weight becomes relevant if a group of Directors is 
conceived as a coalition, in which case the one person-one vote system becomes a 
weighted voting game from the perspective of the coalitions of Directors. 
The Control Test, as applied in Gamboa vs. Teves, conceives the voting situation 
in the Board of Directors as a weighted voting game. It presumes, by legal fiction, that 
the number of nominees of a stockholder in the Board of Directors is a proxy of the 
stockholder’s voting weight. Hence, the voting weight distribution of common 
stockholders determines the level of representation of each common stockholder in the 
Board of Directors, and therefore the voting weight of a presumed coalition of Director 
nominees mirrors the voting weight of a common stockholder. If so, the voting power 
distribution in the Board of Directors also mirrors the voting power distribution of 
common stockholders. This is illustrated as follows: 
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Voting Weight Distribution of 
Stockholders 
(𝑃1 : foreigner) 
Board Representation in 
10 Director Positions 
(𝑃1 : foreign nominees) 
Voting Weight Distribution in the 
Board of Directors 
{40, 60} {4, 6} {40, 60} 
{40, 30, 30} {4, 3, 3} {40, 30, 30} 
{40, 20, 20, 20} {4, 2, 2, 2} {40, 20, 20, 20} 
  
From the illustration, we see how the voting weight of a stockholder is transposed 
into the voting weight of his Director nominees in the Board of Directors, if his Director 
nominees are conceived as a single coalition in the Board. Thus, if 𝑃1 has 40% voting 
weight in the corporation, this entitles him to four Director nominees in the Board, which 
is composed of 10 available seats. The four Directors, conceived as a unit, has a 
combined voting weight of 40% in the Board, equal to the voting weight of 𝑃1 as a 
stockholder. From the voting weight distribution in the Board of Directors, we derive the 
voting power of each coalition of Director nominees, as follows: 
 
Voting Weight 
Distribution of 
Stockholders 
(𝑃1 : foreigner) 
Board 
Representation 
(𝑃1 : foreign 
nominees) 
Voting Weight 
Distribution of 
Board 
Voting Power Distribution in Board of Directors 
(𝑉𝑖) 
Simple Majority 
(q = 51%) 
Super-Majority 
(q = 67%) 
{40, 60} {4, 6} {40, 60} {0%, 100%} {50%, 50%} 
{40, 30, 30} {4, 3, 3} {40, 30, 30} 
{33.33%, 33.33%, 
33.33%} 
{60%, 20%, 20%} 
{40, 20, 20, 20} {4, 2, 2, 2} {40, 20, 20, 20} 
{50%, 16.67%, 16.67%, 
16.67%} 
{40%, 20%, 20%, 
20%} 
 
 If the foreign equity limitation is 40%, and the foreign stockholder has maximized 
the cap, he can elect four nominees in the Board of Directors, which yields a voting 
weight of 40% in the Board. The voting power of the coalition of the foreign 
stockholder’s director nominees, in turn, depends on the quota within the Board, the 
number of Filipino stockholders, the corresponding number of Director nominees of 
Filipino stockholders, and the voting weight of each Filipino stockholder. Thus, while a 
{40, 60} voting weight distribution results in 0% control in the Board for a simple majority 
voting requirement or joint control for a super-majority voting requirement, a {40, 30, 30} 
voting weight distribution results in a de facto control of the Board for a super-majority 
voting requirement, and a {40, 20, 20, 20} voting weight distribution results in a de facto 
control of the Board for both majority and super-majority voting requirements. 
 
EFFECT OF PUBLIC FLOAT 
 
 The public float is that portion of a corporation’s capital stock owned by an 
infinitely large number of stockholders.91 This exists in publicly listed corporations.92 
Each holder of shares of stock in the public float, therefore, virtually possesses 0% 
degree of control, because each member in the public float must deal with an infinitely 
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large number of stockholders to form a coalition of stockholders. 93  To recall, a 
stockholder who deals with fewer stockholders to pass a resolution has more power 
compared to a stockholder who needs to deal with more stockholders.94 Hence, it is 
safe to assume that the public float will never vote as a single coalition, and their 
combined voting weight will not have an impact in the voting power of bloc-holders.95 
A more realistic voting weight distribution of a corporation with public float must 
therefore exclude the combined voting weight of the public float.96 For example, in a {40, 
20, 20, 20} voting weight distribution, where 𝑃1  is a foreign stockholder and 𝑃4 
represents the combined voting weight of the public float, we will not expect that an 
infinitely large number of stockholders will form a coalition to vote the combined voting 
weight of 20%.97 Hence, we modify the voting weight distribution by deducting the public 
float’s combined voting weight of 20% from the total outstanding shares of 100%. We 
then divide the remaining voting weights by the reduced amount of total outstanding 
shares. This yields a new voting weight distribution of {50, 25, 25}, net of public float. 
The corresponding changes in voting power are illustrated as follows: 
 
 
Voting Weight Distribution (𝑤𝑖) Voting Power Distribution (𝑉𝑖) 
With Public Float {51: 40, 20, 20, 20} {50%, 16.67%, 16.67%, 16.67%} 
Without Public Float {51: 50, 25, 25} {60%, 20%, 20%} 
 
 Note that, with the reduction of the combined weight of the public float from the 
distribution, the voting power of 𝑃1 increased by 10% while the individual voting powers 
of 𝑃2 and 𝑃3 increased only by 3.33%. 
 
EFFECT ON THE GRANDFATHER RULE 
 
The Grandfather Rule offers a deceptively simple formula for unraveling chains of 
control in a complex web of corporate layering. According to this rule, if Corporation A 
holds 60% shares in B, which holds 30% shares in C, it follows that A indirectly controls 
18% of C (i.e. 60% multiplied by 30%).98 This method of imputing a fractional share of 
indirect control, however, is based on two flawed assumptions. First, it assumes that 
voting situations across the chain are simultaneously occurring, when the reality is that 
stockholder votes happen sequentially from the first to the second tier of stockholders. 
Second, it treats voting power across the chain as a “continuous variable”, when the 
more accurate method is to treat it as a “discrete variable”.99 
By imputing a fractional share of indirect control, it is as if the voting power of 
minority stockholders in Corporation B is still relevant in determining the result of a 
stockholder meeting in C once A already prevails in a given voting situation in B. The 
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fact is that, with a simple majority voting requirement, A can single-handedly pass a 
motion in a stockholder meeting in B, since A’s voting weight of 60% is already greater 
than the minimum threshold for approving the motion. The total 40% voting weight of 
other minority stockholders in B is immaterial in determining the outcome of the voting 
scenario. The more accurate method, therefore, is to treat voting power along the chain 
as a “discrete variable”: A is the controlling stockholder in B—true or false?100 And if the 
answer is true, then A is deemed to control the entirety of B’s voting weight in C, and 
not just a fraction of 30%. 
A variable is continuous if it can assume infinite values in an interval. This is true 
in the case of voting weights, where the possible values can be any real number 
between 0% and 100%. Voting power varies as the weights change in the continuum of 
infinite possible values. This variable type is appropriate in the Control Test, where a 
slight change in shareholding size can make a stockholder win or lose in a voting 
situation. For example, where stockholders D and E have weights of 50% each, a 
sudden shift of 1% from E to D can make D prevail in a voting scenario, even without 
the cooperation of E. 
A variable is discrete if the possible values are countable and finite. If this is 
applied in measuring voting power across a chain of corporations, there are only two 
possible answers: whether the stockholder in question is dominant in the higher tier or 
not, using a pass-fail criterion. The determination of who is dominant, however, is more 
complex than what is provided by the Control Test. 
To develop an alternative to the Grandfather Rule, we shall construe the 
question, “Who is the controlling stockholder?” as having two dimensions: horizontal 
and vertical.101 Horizontal control refers to the voting power exercised by a stockholder 
relative to other stockholders in a corporation.102 Vertical control refers to the voting 
power exercised by a stockholder across a chain of corporations. 103  In the law on 
foreign investments, the Control Test measures horizontal control, while the 
Grandfather Rule measures vertical control. Horizontal control is continuous, while 
vertical control should be discrete. 
Regardless of whether we measure horizontal control through voting weight or 
voting power, both of them are continuous variables. The same variable type should not 
be applied for measuring vertical control. Voting situations happen successively or 
consecutively, i.e. from the highest tier to the lowest tier of stockholder corporations. 
The proper approach, therefore, is to determine the controlling stockholder in every tier, 
and impute a non-fractional indirect control to the stockholder. To illustrate, consider the 
following ownership structure (Figure 1): 
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 Under the Grandfather Rule, Corporations A and B indirectly control E through D. 
To impute the indirect shareholding, the 70% equity of A and 30% equity of B are 
multiplied with D’s 50% equity in E, in order to arrive at a hypothetical shareholding 
structure with no indirect holding (Figure 2), as follows: 
 
 
  
It is a fallacy to split the 50% equity holding in E between A and B, according to 
the proportion of their equity holding in D. First, this is a voting scenario that will not 
happen in reality because voting across tiers occur in a time series: first between A and 
B, and then between C and D-as-controlled-by-A. Second, the voting power distribution 
in the last tier of stockholders in Figure 1 is very different from the voting power 
distribution in Figure 2. In Figure 1, A can unilaterally pass a stockholder resolution and 
B’s voting weight is immaterial in determining the voting scenario. Hence, when we 
reach the voting scenario in the second tier, C’s voting power is co-equal with D-as-
controlled-by-A, which means that C can veto D’s motion, and D can veto C’s motion. In 
Figure 2, however, we see the voting power of C dilated and that of A diluted by the 
presence of all three stockholders in the tier and by the fractional share of indirect 
control. The possible winning coalitions are: {C, A}, {C, B} and {C, A, B}, but not {A, B}. 
Based on this, A has no veto power against any motion, when in reality A controls the 
entire voting weight of D and is therefore entitled to veto a motion if A so desires. In 
other words, the Grandfather Rule understates the indirect control held by A, as follows: 
 
Control Measurements Figure 1 Figure 2 
Voting Weight C (50%), D (50%) C (50%), A (35%), B (15%) 
Voting Power C (50%), D (50%) C (60%), A (20%), B (20%) 
 
Without the Grandfather Rule (Figure 1), the voting weight in the last tier of 
stockholders reflects their voting power. After applying the Grandfather Rule (Figure 2), 
we see a discrepancy of voting weight and voting power. The increase in the effective 
control of C from a voting weight of 50% to a voting power of 60% reflects the fact that 
C is absolutely needed in every possible stockholder coalition to pass a motion, while 
the decrease in the effective control of A from a voting weight of 35% to a voting power 
of 20% reflects the fact that A is not indispensable to pass a stockholder resolution.  It is 
therefore meaningless to say that A only has 35% indirect control under the Grandfather 
Rule. The more realistic description of the chain of control is as follows: 
 
 
 
REVISITING NARRA NICKEL AND GAMBOA 
 
 What is the effect of the voting power computation on the Supreme Court rulings 
in Narra Nickel Mining vs. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp. and Gamboa vs. Teves? 
Applying the methodology discussed in the previous sections, our findings indicate that 
in Narra Nickel, Filipino stockholders have a degree of control equal to that of the 
foreign stockholder under a super-majority setup, and effective control under a simple 
majority setup, contrary to the ruling of the Supreme Court which accords effective 
control to the foreign stockholder. In Gamboa, our findings indicate that, as of March 
2016, the foreign stockholder has a degree of control equal to that of the Filipino 
stockholders and therefore higher than what the 1987 Constitution allows, both under a 
simple majority and super-majority setup, notwithstanding the fact that the PLDT 
shareholding structure may be compliant within the framework of the Gamboa ruling. 
 
A. NARRA NICKEL MINING VS. REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES CORP. 
 
  In order to undertake exploration and mining activities, a corporation must apply 
for a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) and Exploration Permit (EP) with 
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Sara Marie Mining, 
Inc. (SMMI) applied for an MPSA and EP covering certain areas in the Province of 
Palawan. SMMI assigned its rights under the MPSA application to Madridejos Mining 
Corporation (MMC), and MMC further assigned them to McArthur Mining, Inc. 
(“McArthur”). Subsequently, SMMI again applied for another MPSA covering another 
area of Palawan. SMMI assigned its rights under the second MPSA application to 
Tesoro Mining and Development, Inc. (“Tesoro”). On a separate occasion, Alpha 
Resources and Development Corporation (ARDC) and Patricia Louise Mining & 
Development Corporation (PLMDC) applied for an MPSA in other areas of Palawan. 
PLMDC, in turn, assigned its rights under the MPSA application to Narra Nickel Mining 
and Development Corp. (“Narra Nickel”). 
  McArthur, Tesoro and Narra Nickel were the existing right-holders under the 
MPSA applications when Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp. (“Redmont”) took interest 
in undertaking exploration and mining activities in areas of Palawan already covered by 
the said MPSA applications. Redmont filed petitions for denial with the Panel of 
Arbitrators (POA) under the DENR, alleging that MBMI Resources, Inc. (“MBMI”) owned 
at least 60% of the capital stock of McArthur, Tesoro and Narra Nickel. This would 
disqualify the MPSA applicants from undertaking mining and exploration activities in 
Palawan for being foreign nationals, pursuant to Section 3(aq) of Republic Act No. 7492 
(Philippine Mining Act of 1995), which states that a “Qualified person” which is also a 
corporation must have at least 60% of the capital owned by citizens of the Philippines. 
MBMI is a 100% Canadian corporation. 
  Moreover, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides, “The 
exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full 
control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or 
it may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with 
Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose 
capital is owned by such citizens.” 
  The corporate ownership structures of McArthur, Tesoro and Narra Nickel are 
illustrated as follows: 
 
Corporate Ownership Structure of McArthur 
 
 
 
Corporate Ownership Structure of Tesoro 
 
 
 
Corporate Ownership Structure of Narra Nickel 
 
 
 
  In McArthur, MBMI is a Canadian corporation, OMDC is a Filipino corporation, 
and MMC is a Filipino corporation. At issue is the corporate nationality of McArthur. 
Since MMC is partly owned by a Filipino corporation (OMDC) and a Canadian 
corporation (MBMI), the Supreme Court bifurcated the 59.97% stockholding of MMC in 
McArthur as consisting partly of Filipino equity and partly of Canadian equity. Hence, of 
the 59.97% equity of MMC, 39.96% (66.63% x 59.97%) represents indirect Filipino 
equity while 19.98% (33.31% x 59.97%) represents indirect Canadian equity. The 
19.98% indirect Canadian equity through MMC’s stockholding is then added to 39.98% 
direct Canadian equity represented by the direct shareholding of MBMI in McArthur, 
resulting in an effective total Canadian equity in McArthur of 59.96%, which exceeds the 
40% foreign equity limitation for mining and exploration activities. The Filipino equity in 
McArthur consists of the indirect equity from OMDC, which is 39.96%, and the negligible 
equity from Filipino minority stockholders. 
  In Tesoro, MBMI has a direct Canadian equity of 39.98%, added to an indirect 
Canadian equity through SMMI of 19.98% (33.31% x 59.97%), for an effective total 
Canadian equity of 59.96%. In Narra Nickel, MBMI has a direct Canadian equity of 
39.97%, added to an indirect Canadian equity through PLMDC of 20.36% (33.96% x 
59.96%), for an effective total Canadian equity of 60.33%. 
  It is true that, with respect to dividend rights and other economic rights in 
McArthur, Tesoro and Narra Nickel, the Canadian national has effective total economic 
rights exceeding the 40% foreign equity limitation once we add the direct and indirect 
shareholdings of MBMI. But the same cannot be said about corporate control. Applying 
the methodology for computing voting power discussed in the previous sections, it is 
erroneous to conclude that MBMI has an effective voting power of 59.96% in McArthur, 
59.96% in Tesoro, and 60.33% in Narra Nickel. 
 Each of the three corporate ownership structures have two tiers. To determine 
the corporate nationality of McArthur based on control, the first step is to determine the 
voting power distribution in the upper tier and identify the stockholder with effective 
control. The second step is to impute the entirety of the indirect shareholding to the 
controlling stockholder identified in the first step. The third step is to determine the 
voting power distribution in the lower tier and identify the stockholder with effective 
control. For McArthur, we analyze the upper tier as follows: 
 
Stockholders of 
MMC 
Voting Weight Distribution in MMC 
Voting Power Distribution in MMC 
(𝑽𝒊) 
Simple Majority 
(q = 51%) 
Super-Majority 
(q = 67%) 
{OMDC, MBMI, 6 
minority 
stockholders} 
{66.63%, 33.31%, .01% per stockholder}  {100%, 0%, 0%} {100%, 0%, 0%} 
 
The voting weights of the Filipino corporation (OMDC) and the Canadian 
corporation (MBMI) in MMC are 66.63% and 33.31%, respectively. But regardless of 
whether the threshold for passing stockholder resolutions is based on simple majority or 
super-majority (2/3), OMDC is a “dictator stockholder”, i.e. capable of passing 
stockholder resolutions without the cooperation of other stockholders. The substantial 
stockholding of 33.31%, which represents Canadian equity, has an effective control 
equivalent to 0%. Hence, for the purpose of analyzing the voting power distribution in 
the lower tier, we must impute the entire stockholding of MMC in McArthur as belonging 
solely to OMDC. Analysis of the lower tier is as follows: 
 
Stockholders 
of McArthur 
Voting Weight Distribution in McArthur 
Voting Power Distribution in McArthur 
(𝑽𝒊) 
Simple Majority 
(q = 51%) 
Super-Majority 
(q = 67%) 
{MBMI, MMC, 5 
minority 
stockholders} 
{39.98%, 59.97%, .01% per stockholder}  {0%, 100%, 0%} {50%, 50%, 0%} 
 
 The voting power distribution in the lower tier is one where the decision threshold 
becomes material. If the threshold is simple majority, MMC (as effectively controlled by 
OMDC) is a “dictator stockholder”. However, if the threshold is 2/3 or super-majority, 
MMC and MBMI have joint control. 
 Considering the similarity in the three corporate ownership structures of McArthur 
and Tesoro, we arrive the same conclusions in Tesoro. The ownership structure of 
Narra Nickel, however, is slightly different. Analysis of the upper tier is as follows: 
 
Stockholders of 
PLMDC 
Voting Weight Distribution in PLMDC 
Voting Power Distribution in PLMDC 
(𝑽𝒊) 
Simple Majority 
(q = 51%) 
Super-Majority 
(q = 67%) 
{Palawan Alpha, 
MBMI, 8 minority 
stockholders} 
{65.96%, 33.96%, .01% per stockholder}  {100%, 0%, 0%} {50%, 50%, 0%} 
 
 The difference is that under a super-majority (2/3), the Filipino corporation 
(Palawan Alpha) and the Canadian corporation (MBMI) have joint or equal control of 
PLMDC. Analysis of the lower tier is as follows: 
 
Stockholders 
of Narra 
Nickel 
Voting Weight Distribution in Narra 
Nickel 
Voting Power Distribution in Narra Nickel 
(𝑽𝒊) 
Simple Majority 
(q = 51%) 
Super-Majority 
(q = 67%) 
{MBMI, 
PLMDC, 7 
minority 
stockholders} 
{59.96%, 39.97%, .01% per stockholder}  {100%, 0%, 0%} {50%, 50%, 0%} 
 
 Once more, under a super-majority (2/3), PLMDC and MBMI have joint or equal 
control. While this may represent veto power, it neither represents minority control nor 
effective control. Whether the decision threshold is simple majority or super-majority, 
the conclusion we arrive at is different from the ruling of the Supreme Court, which 
imputes effective control of McArthur, Tesoro and Narra Nickel to the foreign national. 
Our findings indicate that the Filipino corporation has effective control under a simple 
majority setup, and has at least equal control under a super-majority setup. 
 
B. GAMBOA VS. TEVES 
 
 PLDT has an existing franchise to operate a telecommunications business in the 
Philippines. Based on the 2010 General Information Sheet (GIS) of PLDT, foreigners 
hold 120,046,690 common shares of PLDT while Filipinos hold 66,750,622 common 
shares; hence, foreign stockholders have 64.27% voting weight while Filipino 
stockholders have 35.73%. The Supreme Court ruled that “[s]ince holding a majority of 
the common shares equates to control, it is clear that foreigners exercise control over 
PLDT. Such amount of control unmistakably exceeds the allowable 40 percent limit on 
foreign ownership of public utilities expressly mandated in Section 11, Article XII of the 
Constitution.” 
  As of March 2016, the shareholding structure of PLDT insofar as common shares 
are concerned is as follows: 
 
 
 
 The voting power analysis yields the following initial results: 
 
Common 
stockholders of PLDT 
Voting Weight 
Distribution among 
PLDT common 
stockholders 
Voting Power Distribution among PLDT 
common stockholders 
(𝑽𝒊) 
Simple Majority 
(q = 51%) 
Super-Majority 
(q = 67%) 
{First Pacific Group, 
NTT Group, Held by 
the Public, J.G. Summit 
Group, Directors and 
Officers} 
{25.57%, 20.35%, 45.88%, 
8.01%, 0.19%}  
{16.67%, 16.67%, 
50%, 16.67%%, 0%} 
{30%, 10%, 50%, 
10%, 0%} 
 
  Considering, however, that “Held by the Public” shares and shares held by 
“Directors and Officers” constitute a large number of individual stockholders, with each 
having separate but negligible voting rights in PLDT, it is erroneous to treat them as 
blockholders capable of voting their shares as a single unit. Accordingly, we must apply 
the rules discussed under the section entitled Effect of Public Float to factor out the 
shareholdings represented by dispersed shareholders. For purposes of computing 
voting power, the modified shareholding structure only includes the blockholders First 
Pacific Group, NTT Group and J.G. Summit Group, with the following modified voting 
weights: {47.41%, 37.73%, 14.85%}. Analysis of this voting weight distribution is as 
follows: 
 
Common 
stockholders of PLDT 
Voting Weight 
Distribution among 
PLDT common 
stockholders 
Voting Power Distribution among PLDT 
common stockholders 
(𝑽𝒊) 
Simple Majority 
(q = 51%) 
Super-Majority 
(q = 67%) 
{First Pacific Group, 
NTT Group, J.G. 
Summit Group} 
{47.41%, 37.73%, 14.85%} 
{33.33%, 33.33%, 
33.33%} 
{50%, 50%, 0%} 
 
  Under a simple majority setup, NTT Group (which represents foreign equity) has 
joint or equal control as the other Filipino stockholders. Under a super-majority setup, 
NTT Group has power to veto the motions of First Pacific Group. This accords a degree 
of de facto control to the foreign stockholder higher than what the 1987 Constitution 
allows. 
  The intent to bestow veto power to the NTT Group is evident in its 2011 Annual 
Report, as duly filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to 
Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and filings with the 
Philippine Stock Exchange in 2012. PLDT discloses the content of a Shareholders 
Agreement bestowing “contractual veto rights” to the NTT Group, as follows: 
 
As a result of the Cooperation Agreement, NTT Communications and NTT DOCOMO, in 
coordination with each other, have contractual veto rights over a number of major 
decisions and transactions that PLDT could make or enter into, including: 
  
• capital expenditures in excess of US$50 million; 
 
• any investments, if the aggregate amount of all investments for the previous 
12 months is greater than US$25 million in the case of all investments to any 
existing investees and US$100 million in the case of all investments to any 
new or existing investees, determined on a rolling monthly basis; 
 
• any investments in a specific investee, if the cumulative value of all 
investments made by us in that investee is greater than US$10 million in the 
case of an existing investee and US$50 million in the case of a new investee; 
 
• issuance of common stock or stock that is convertible into common stock; 
 
• new business activities other than those we currently engage in; and 
 
• merger or consolidation. 
 
CONCLUSION: THREE PRINCIPLES OF A RIGOROUS CONTROL TEST 
 
Based on the foregoing ratiocinations, we postulate three principles of a rigorous 
test of voting power, which are lacking in the Control Test: (1) monotonicity, (2) a 
prioricity, and (3) probability. “Monotonicity” means that as the value of the voting power 
measurement increases or decreases, the actual degree of control that it describes 
likewise increases or decreases. “a prioricity” means that, in measuring degrees of 
control, we make no assumptions about the preferences of stockholders in forming 
coalitions with other stockholders. “Probability” is a consequence of a prioricity: since 
we make no assumptions about stockholder preferences, the voting power 
measurement must consider all possible stockholder coalitions and their corresponding 
voting outcomes, in order to determine which stockholder is most or least likely to 
dictate a voting scenario. We explain further as follows: 
 
1. Monotonicity. – The higher is the amount of shares of stock owned by a 
stockholder, the higher is the amount of economic rights. This is not true in 
the case of control or voting rights, as measured by the Control Test. As 
demonstrated in the previous sections, increasing voting rights does not 
necessarily increase voting power, and decreasing voting rights does not 
necessarily decrease voting power. Hence, shareholding size or voting weight 
has a “non-monotonic” relationship with voting power. Contrast this with the 
voting power measurement we discussed in the previous sections, where a 
higher 𝑉𝑖 indicates more control and a lower figure indicates lesser control. In 
this method of measuring control, the magnitude of a stockholder’s 𝑉𝑖  is 
“monotonic” with the actual degree of control in the corporation. 
 
2. a prioricity. – The Control Test, as applied by the courts in corporate 
nationality disputes, makes a priori assumptions about the preferences of 
stockholders in forming coalitions. For example, given a voting weight 
distribution of {40, 20, 20, 20} with 𝑃1 as foreign stockholder, and given a 
foreign equity cap of 40%, the Control Test adds up the individual voting 
weights of 𝑃2, 𝑃3 and 𝑃4, for a combined weight of 60%. The Control Test 
therefore assumes a fictional voting scenario where the three Filipino 
stockholders will combine to form a coalition in order to block a motion by 𝑃1. 
It is because of this assumption that the Control Test treats the corporation as 
a Philippine national, since it is under the de jure control of Filipino 
stockholders. 
In our proposal, we do not make an assumption about stockholder 
preferences. Absent any prior information, the a priori assumption should be 
that all possible stockholder preferences are equally likely. In the {40, 20, 20, 
20} distribution, there is no basis to combine the voting weights of Filipino 
stockholders by virtue of their common nationality. 𝑃1 is just as likely to form a 
coalition with 𝑃2 as 𝑃2 is likely to form a coalition with 𝑃3 or 𝑃4. 
 
3. Probability. – Considering that we have no a priori information about 
stockholder preferences in forming coalitions, a rigorous Control Test must 
consider all possible stockholder preferences and therefore, all possible 
coalitions. Each possible coalition contains information about which 
stockholder can make the coalition win or lose in a given voting scenario. The 
formula for 𝑉𝑖  measures the frequency of this information, from which is 
derived the likelihood that a stockholder’s motion will prevail.  
 
 This essay lays down the theoretical foundation of a rigorous voting power 
measurement, as applied in the law on the determination of corporation nationality for 
the purpose of foreign investments. As agenda for future research, the logical next step 
is to survey the current state of voting power structures in corporations engaged in 
partially nationalized economic activities, with the aim of ascertaining whether—using 
voting power index in cooperative game theory—Filipino majority stockholders truly 
have “effective control” of said corporations given their existing ownership structures. 
